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 One useful way to employ survey data to understand presidential election 
outcomes is to decompose the electoral decision into a set of “components” measuring 
different aspects of the election.  The American Voter (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and 
Stokes 1960) utilized a decomposition into six components, analyzing how attitudes 
toward the Republican and Democratic candidates, domestic and foreign issues, social 
groups, and parties as managers of government moved the vote decision in the 1952 and 
1956 elections (see also Stokes, Campbell, and Miller 1958).  This paper analyzes how 
these components have changed in importance over the past half-century.  Additionally, 
this paper augments the components model by developing summary measures of the 
short-term forces affecting election results. 
 Neither The American Voter nor The American Voter Revisited deals sufficiently 
with the implications of party identification for how the six components affect the 
electoral decision.  After analyzing the impact of the six components on the vote, they do 
an additional analysis of the impact of those components controlling for party 
identification, but that treats the effects of party identification as linear rather than 
recognizing its inherent interactive character.  The six partisan attitudes do not affect the 
electorate in a uniform manner.  As The American Voter and The American Voter 
Revisited both showed, Democrat identifiers have more pro-Democratic means on all the 
six partisan attitudes and Republican identifiers have more pro-Republican means on all 
of them.  Consider, however, a polarized component on which Democratic identifiers 
tend to be pro-Democratic (such as giving more pro-Democratic than anti-Democratic 
comments about the Democratic presidential candidate) and on which Republican 
identifiers tend to be pro-Republican (giving more comments against the Democratic 
candidate than for her).  Regardless of whether the net effect of that component helps the 
Democrats or hurts them, the logic of the model is that it helps them among their own 
partisans, hurts them among the other party’s partisans, and the real effect of that 
component is determined by how it plays among Independents.  If one assumes the 
partisans are extremely likely to stay with their party regardless of short-term factors, 
then it is really just the effect among Independents that will matter.  Therefore, this paper 
also extends the basic components model by adding a special focus on political 
independents. 
 
The Basic Components Model 
 The basic components model is fairly simple.  The National Election Studies 
surveys ask a series of eight open-ended questions as to what the respondents like and 
dislike about each party and its presidential candidate.  Human coders subsequently 
classify each respondent’s answers into an elaborate set of “master codes,” coding up to 
five responses on each of the eight questions.  These codes are then classified into a set of 
“partisan attitudes.”  In preparing The American Voter Revisited, we attempted to classify 
the responses into categories using classification decisions that matched as closely as 
possible to those employed for The American Voter, though there were inevitably several 
difficult decisions as to how to classify particular codes.
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  In any case, we categorized 
responses as referring to the Republican and Democratic candidates, domestic and 
foreign issues, social groups, and parties as managers of government. 
 The next step of the components model is to construct the six separate 
components.  In each case, we counted up the number of pro-Republican or anti-
Democratic) comments made by the respondent in a category (such as the number of 
comments made about what the person likes about the Republican party or candidate on 
domestic issues and what the person dislikes about the Democratic party or candidate on 
domestic issues) across the eight questions, counted up the number of pro-Democratic or 
anti-Republican comments made by the respondent in the same category across the eight 
questions, and then took the difference.  Since these measures are constructed on the 
basis of up to 5 answers to each of 8 questions, the components could each conceivably 
have a range of -40 to +40. 
 The third step is to regress the individual’s vote decision on these components 
along with computing the mean on each component.  The impact of the component on the 
vote decision is then the product of a component’s unstandardized regression coefficient 
and its mean.  This value shows how much each component moved the vote decision, 
controlling for the other components. 
 This model has been applied to several elections.  The American Voter (Campbell, 
Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960) employed it for analyzing the 1952 and 1956 
elections (see also Stokes, Campbell, and Miller 1958) and Stokes (1966) extended this 
analysis to the 1960 and 1964 elections.  Later analysts extended it through 1972 (Kagay 
and Caldeira 1980; Pomper 1975; Miller and Miller 1976; Popkin 1976) and 1980 (Miller 
and Wattenberg 1981).  More recently, The American Voter Revisited (Lewis-Beck, 
Jacoby, Norpoth, and Weisberg 2008, chap. 14) employed this model for analyzing the 
2000 and 2004 elections.
2
 
 Methodologically, there are two obvious issues with this components model.  
First, the reliance on open-ended comments can be questioned.  For example, the scores 
are affected by how verbal the respondents are, so some respondents will have more 
extreme scores than others simply because they give more elaborate answers as to why 
they like and dislike the parties and candidates.  Some analysts would prefer using 
closed-ended questions to analyze vote determinants rather than these open-ended 
questions; see Kessel and Weisberg (1999) for a detailed discussion of the stakes 
involved in this choice. 
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 Erin McAdams performed the categorization. 
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 In a related series of analyses, Kessel (Smith and Kessel 1995; Smith, Radcliffe, and Kessel 1999; Kessel 
2004; Kessel 2005) employed both a simpler decomposition into only 3 components (candidates, issues, 
and parties) and a more elaborate decomposition into 16 components (e.g., candidate experience, 
international involvement, and comments about other people in the party). 
 The second issue is the use of ordinary least-squares regression analysis on a 
dichotomous dependent variable rather than using logit or probit analysis.  As is well 
understood, the linear assumption underlying OLS regression, when applied to 
dichotomous variables, leads to predictions that some people will have probabilities 
above one and others will have probabilities below zero of displaying the dependent 
behavior, both of which violate the rules of probability theory.  By contrast, logit and 
probit analysis are well behaved in this sense because they are non-linear.  The American 
Voter might have used logit or probit if they had been easy to compute in the 1950s, 
though Stokes (1966, 28) later argued against using such analyses since “the distribution 
of the electorate along an attitude dimension is much more easily summarized under the 
linear model.”  Most important, the impact of each component on the vote decision 
cannot be so readily calculated with non-linear models, since it would not be appropriate 
to multiply the regression coefficients by their respective means.
3
 
 
Extending the Components Model 
 In addition to comparing the components model results for the 2000 and 2004 
elections to those for earlier elections, the basic American Voter components model will 
be extended in two ways in this paper.  First, the factors affecting voting turnout will be 
examined by using turnout as a dependent variable in addition to the usual component 
analysis of vote direction.
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  Thus, it will be possible to see the extent to which attitudes 
toward each candidate, domestic and foreign issues, social groups, and parties as 
managers of government affect the decision as to whether to vote.  Some of these 
attitudes may mobilize respondents to vote in a particular election, while others may not. 
 This analysis of turnout is vulnerable to the usual problems associated with 
overreport of turnout in NES surveys, though hopefully the factors leading to overreport 
are not correlated with the factors associated with the turnout decision.  More important, 
Democrats vote at lower rates than Republicans, which will confound the analysis since 
components that favor the Republicans in a particular election will appear stronger than 
those that help the Democrats – which may be why Stokes and colleagues did not include 
this in their work; fortunately this problem can be handled by controlling for party 
identification.  [Comments on the turnout analysis will be appreciated – I like the idea of 
using the components to analyze turnout, but I need feedback as to whether this part of 
the analysis is worthwhile.] 
 Second, the component analysis will be broken down to focus on political 
independents.  After all, partisans rarely defect to the other major party (only 6%-8% did 
in the 2000 and 2004 elections), so there would not be enough variation in their voting 
direction for regression analysis.  However, independents swing from one party to the 
other, and their choices are essential to determining the outcome of an election.  
Therefore the component analysis will be performed separately for self-declared 
Independents, as determined by the first party identification question. 
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 The Kessel papers referenced above use different approaches to trying to achieve an impact analysis from 
probit, but there is no simple definitive procedure for doing so. 
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 Another way to accomplish this goal would be to employ multinomial logit analysis on a trichotomous 
vote variable – voted Republican, voted Democrat, and did not vote – though that again would raise the 
problem of how measure the impact of each component when coefficients cannot be legitimately multiplied 
by the variables’ means. 
 Leaners are included with Independents in this analysis rather than with the party 
to which they admit being closer.  Keith et al. (1992) argue that leaners should be 
combined with partisans, but that would leave too few independents for separate analysis.  
Instead, this paper follows Johnston, Hagen, and Jamieson (2004) in recognizing that 
treating leaners as independents leads to more stable categories.  The Independents who 
say they are closer to one party or another may simply be reporting how they are 
currently planning to vote in the upcoming election, which can swing back and forth 
several times before the actual election takes place (Shively 1977, 16-20).  That may 
make leaners look like they are voting about the same as weak partisans, but, according 
to this interpretation, they are coming to that decision because of short-term factors more 
than long-term factors. 
 Two further adjustments to the usual components model are made in this paper.  
While regression analysis is used to determine the size of effects, statistical significance 
will be determined through logistic regression.  As is commonly claimed, the results 
using regression and logit analysis are not very different, but there would be differences 
in some of the analyses reported here as to which components are deemed to have 
significant effects.  These are generally instances where one component barely passes the 
significance test with one model and not with the other, but it seems safer to judge 
significance on the basis of the statistical model that is actually appropriate for 
dichotomous dependent variables. 
 The other adjustment involves the social group component.  The components are 
generally interpreted as short-term factors affecting the vote.  However, the social group 
component measures long-term group identification matters that are very close to party 
identification itself, much more than it measures short-term election-related factors.  
Most of the social group references coded into this category relate speak about the 
coalitional bases of the parties: that the Democrats are good for the working, or not good 
for business people, or good for blacks, or not good for Christian fundamentalists, or 
similar statements (or the converse statements as regards Republicans) that are typically 
related to why the respondents are or are not Democrat in their partisanship.  There are 
occasionally more short-term matters incorporated into this component when a specific 
social cleavage becomes salient for a particular presidential election, but that is the 
exception rather than the rule.  Because of the long-term perspective of the social group 
component, it will be disregarded when this paper treats the components as short-term. 
 
Vote Components over Time 
 Table 1 shows the effects of the six components on the electoral decision from 
1952 to 1980 (Miller and Wattenberg 1981) and for 2000 and 2004 (Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, 
Norpoth, and Weisberg 2008).  As analysts have typically found over the years, the social 
group component has always helped the Democratic vote, while managing government 
has nearly always worked in favor of the Republicans (with the sole exception during this 
time frame of 1964), and these patterns continued in 2000 and 2004. 
 
Table 1.  Components of the Vote Decision, 1952-1980, 2000-2004* 
 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980  2000 2004 
            
D candidate -1.18 .17 -1.99 -3.93 .90 4.29 -.05 -.93  .68 1.62 
R candidate 4.37 7.60 5.70 -2.60 1.60 3.98 .24 -.70  .35 1.45 
Domestic issues -1.34 -.88 -.54 -2.36 1.10 1.35 -.69 2.70  .00 -.72 
Foreign issues 3.30 2.46 1.80 -.25 1.00 3.23 .40 3.06  .56 -1.30 
Gov't management 5.40 1.18 1.20 -.30 1.50 .04 .17 2.87  .59 .60 
Social groups -4.29 -5.50 -4.01 -2.59 -3.60 -4.55 -4.53 -5.08  -4.08 -3.16 
            
            
sum 6.26 5.03 2.16 -12.03 2.50 8.34 -4.46 1.92  -1.90 -1.51 
sum without social 
groups 10.55 10.53 6.17 -9.44 6.10 12.89 .07 7.00  2.18 1.65 
            
sum |abs| 19.88 17.79 15.24 12.03 9.70 17.44 6.08 15.34  6.26 8.85 
sum |abs| w/o social 
groups 15.59 12.29 11.23 9.44 6.10 12.89 1.55 10.26  2.18 5.69 
            
standard deviation 3.85 4.29 3.37 1.45 1.99 3.34 1.89 3.21  1.86 1.84 
stdev without social 
groups 3.17 3.31 2.91 1.59 0.31 1.82 0.43 2.03  0.27 1.30 
*Each component, including attitudes toward the Democratic candidate, is coded in a pro-Republican 
direction, so positive values show that the component helped the Republicans and negative values show it 
helped the Democrats. 
Sources: Miller and Wattenberg (1981) and Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norpoth, and Weisberg (2008). 
 
 What is more interesting is the issue side, where the results for 2000 and 2004 do 
not comfortably fit usual patterns.  Domestic issues have generally favored the 
Democrats over the years (with significant exceptions for the Reagan election of 1980 
and the Nixon victories in 1968 and 1972).  They still favored the Democrats in Bush’s 
victory in 2004, but they were exactly neutral in the close 2000 contest.  Foreign issues 
have generally favored the Republicans over the years (with the exception of when the 
Republicans nominated Barry Goldwater in 1964).  They still favored the Republicans in 
2000, but they swung decidedly in the Democratic direction in 2004 because of negative 
reactions to the Iraq War. 
 The candidate side is also interesting.  One would expect that each party’s 
candidate would help garner votes for their party, but there are interesting exceptions 
when one party nominates a candidate who turns out to be weak as Goldwater was for the 
Republicans in 1964 and McGovern was for the Democrats in 1972.  Table 1 shows that 
Reagan cost the Republicans votes in 1980, while Humphrey cost the Democrats votes in 
1968 and Stevenson in 1956 and Carter in 1976 did not attract votes for the Democrats.  
In 2000, the Bush candidacy did little to move the election toward the Republicans, and 
the Gore candidacy actually moved the vote more in a Republican direction than did the 
Bush candidacy.  Bush moved the vote more in a Republican direction in 2004, but the 
Democratic candidate again moved the vote in the Republican direction more than Bush 
did.  In short, the Democratic candidates in 2000 and 2004 did not end up helping their 
own causes. 
 Several sets of summary statistics are provided in the bottom rows of Table 1, 
chosen to tap what the components reflect about short-term forces. Since the social group 
factor is mainly long-term, the summary statistics on the first five components – without 
the social group component – are of greatest interest here.  
 The sum row shows how much the components together moved the vote.  What is 
most noticeable is how much smaller the entries for 2000 and 2004 are than for most 
earlier elections.  For example, the first five components moved the vote decidedly in the 
Republican direction in the 1950s, allowing the Republicans to overcome a real 
Democratic advantage in party identification.  They were pro-Republican enough in 1960 
to make the Kennedy-Nixon election a very narrow Democratic victory even though the 
Democrats still had the advantage in party identification.  The sums of the first five 
components were only slightly pro-Republican in 2000 and 2004, but the Democratic 
edge in party identification was much weaker, allowing the 2000 election to be close 
enough that the popular vote winner did not win the Electoral College and allowing the 
Republicans to win the 2004 popular vote. 
 The next two rows in Table 1 show the sums of the absolute values of the effects 
of the components, showing how strong the short-term forces were.  Again, the values for 
2000 and 2004 are much smaller than most of the earlier entries.  The first five 
components were major aspects of the 1950s elections, but short-term forces were much 
milder in 2000, and they were still relatively weak in 2004. 
 The bottom rows in Table 1 give the standard deviations of the components in 
each election year, so one can more readily judge how uniform they were in magnitude.  
Yet again the entries for 2000 and 2004 are distinctive, especially in comparison with the 
1950s.  The components in the 1950s varied more in their values, as when government 
management and the Eisenhower candidacy gave the Republicans several percentage 
points in the vote in 1952 while domestic issues and the Stevenson candidacy each gave 
the Democrats at least one percentage point that year.  By contrast, none of the first five 
components moved the vote even one percentage point in 2000, and none of those five 
aided the Democrats.  The components varied more in 2004, but the standard deviation 
that year was still on the low side. 
 To summarize, the five short-term components of the vote had relatively little 
effect in 2000 and 2004.  Collectively they moved the vote little, they were weak as 
short-term forces, and they were relatively uniform.  Most analysts view contemporary 
partisan politics as highly polarized (cf. Fiorina 2005).  At first blush, polarization would 
seem to imply that the short-term components would be very important.  Instead, 
polarization means that there is less room for the short-term forces to matter.  If people 
are voting their partisanship more (Bartels 2000), as was the case in these two elections, 
then short-term factors are weaker – though there still can be some effect of short-term 
forces in slightly changing the distribution of party identification (Johnston, Hagen, and 
Jamieson 2004, 43; Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norpoth, and Weisberg 2008, 420). 
 
The Components within Partisan Categories 
 Table 2 shows the means for each component by party identification in 2000 and 
2004.  One would expect that nonvoters would be less likely to make comments than 
voters, so the means for nonvoters would be closer to zero than those for voters.  That 
pattern generally holds in Table 2, except for occasional comparisons where the 
differences are so small as to be nonsignificant. 
 
Table 2.  Means of Components for Turnout and Vote, 2000 and 2004* 
Means Turnout 00 Turnout 04 Vote 00 Vote 04 
         
Democrats .78 .77 .08 .08 
RCAND -.73 -.64 -.86 -.76 
DCAND -.72 -.80 -.75 -.87 
DOMESTIC -1.99 -1.66 -2.19 -1.98 
FOREIGN .01 -.94 .01 -1.01 
GROUP -1.44 -1.41 -1.62 -1.51 
MANAGE -.44 -.63 -.43 -.60 
     
Independents .64 .60 .54 .42 
RCAND .08 -.06 .19 -.15 
DCAND .14 .12 .16 .09 
DOMESTIC -.09 -.51 .00 -.66 
FOREIGN .10 -.28 .16 -.33 
GROUP -.48 -.63 -.55 -.92 
MANAGE .15 .00 .18 .08 
     
Republicans .83 .89 .92 .94 
RCAND .96 1.23 1.08 1.26 
DCAND .98 1.44 1.08 1.45 
DOMESTIC 2.42 1.51 2.80 1.63 
FOREIGN .20 .75 .24 .74 
GROUP -.02 -.06 -.03 -.06 
MANAGE .76 1.01 .83 1.08 
*Each component, including attitudes toward the Democratic candidate, is coded in a pro-Republican 
direction, so positive values show that there were more pro-Republican (and anti-Democratic) comments 
on the component than pro-Democratic (and anti-Republican) comments. 
 
 As to be expected, the means on each component are most pro-Republican for 
Republican identifiers and least pro-Republican for Democratic identifiers.  Most of the 
components break in the Republican direction among Republican identifiers and in the 
Democratic direction among Democratic identifiers, with the interesting exceptions of 
foreign issues, which did not favor the Democrats even among Democratic identifiers in 
2000, and social groups, which did not the Republicans even among Republican 
identifiers in either election year. 
 The other pattern to look at in Table 2 involves change between 2000 and 2004 
within party identification categories.  Views of Bush became somewhat more extreme 
for partisans and changed from positive to negative among Independents.  Republican 
views of the Democratic candidate became more negative, while the mean for 
Independents became slightly less negative.  Comments on domestic issues became less 
extreme for Democrats, while becoming decidedly anti-Republican among Independents.  
Comments on foreign issues became more extreme for partisans, while switching from 
pro-Republican to pro-Democrat among Independents.  Comments about parties as 
managers of government became somewhat more extreme among partisans, while 
becoming more neutral among Independents.   
 The regression coefficients for Independents are shown in Table 3, with 
significant values bolded.  Few variables significantly affected turnout, and the patterns 
are not very interesting. Views of the two candidates and social group comments affected 
the vote of Independents in both elections, with domestic issues being significant in 2000 
and foreign issues in 2004.
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Table 3.  Coefficients of Components for Turnout and Vote among Independents, 2000 
and 2004* 
Coefficients Turnout 00 Turnout 04 Vote 00 Vote 04 
     
(constant) .620 .531 .537 .516 
RCAND .016 -.016 .053 .102 
DCAND .000 .007 .083 .060 
DOMESTIC -.003 -.010 .051 .023 
FOREIGN .072 -.008 .045 .102 
GROUP -.028 -.094 .058 .042 
MANAGE .001 .040 .031 -.006 
% predicted 64.0% 57.6% 54.2% 86.8% 
*Bolded values are significant.  Each component, including attitudes toward the Democratic candidate, is 
coded in a pro-Republican direction, so positive values show that claimed turnout is greater and Republican 
voting is greater as the net comments on the component are more pro-Republican. 
 
 Table 4 shows the effects of the components on turnout and the vote.  The 
Independent vote in 2000 was pushed in a Republican direction by attitudes toward Bush 
and Gore, and, to a lesser extent, foreign issues and government management, with only 
social groups moving their vote in a Democratic direction.  In 2004, the Independent vote 
was moved in a Democratic direction by social groups and foreign issues, and, to a lesser 
extent, attitudes toward Bush and domestic issues, with attitudes toward Kerry moving 
their vote slightly in the Republican direction. 
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 The regression equations were also computed separately for Democratic and for Republican identifiers.  
However, the defection rates among partisans were so low in these elections (4%-6%) that there is not 
enough variance on the dependent variables in these regressions to have confidence in the analysis.  
[Feedback on whether to proceed with this analysis for partisans would be appreciated.] 
Table 4.  Effects of Components for Turnout and Vote, 2000 and 2004* 
Effects Turnout 00 Turnout 04 Vote 00 Vote 04 
         
Independents       
RCAND 0.1 0.1 1.0 -1.5 
DCAND 0.0 0.1 1.4 0.5 
DOMESTIC 0.0 0.5 0.0 -1.5 
FOREIGN 0.7 0.2 0.7 -3.4 
GROUP 1.3 5.9 -3.2 -3.9 
MANAGE 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 
*Values corresponding to significant regression coefficients are bolded.  Each component, including 
attitudes toward the Democratic candidate, is coded in a pro-Republican direction, so positive values show 
that the component helped the Republicans and negative values show it helped the Democrats. 
 
 What is most interesting in Table 4 is how all the components among 
Independents advantaged the Republicans less in 2004 than in 2000.  Social groups, 
foreign issues, and even attitudes toward George W. Bush cost the Republicans 
significant numbers of votes among Independents in 2004.  We generally expect that 
candidates win because short-term factors lead Independents to break in favor of them, 
but that was not the case in 2004.  Bush’s 2004 victory was due the electorate being 
slightly more Republican in partisanship, not due to how Independents evaluated short-
term forces. 
 
Conclusions 
 The vote components model of The American Voter was used periodically 
through 1980, but hadn’t been used again until The American Voter Revisited employed it 
again for 2000 and 2004.  Only the social group factor helped the Democrats in 2000, 
while Bush’s victory in 2004 was based on positive views of his candidacy and negative 
views of John Kerry’s candidacy, with foreign issues hurting the Republicans that year. 
 While this summary of the 2000 and 2004 election in terms of vote components is 
interesting, it is more interesting to note that the short-term components were relatively 
mild in these two elections.  They were relatively uniform, and they moved the vote little.  
These were polarized elections in which long-term partisanship had a large effect and 
short-term factors were weaker. 
 The conventional wisdom is that elections turn on how Independents are affected 
by short-term forces.  Breaking the electorate down by partisan categories shows that was 
not the case in 2004.  None of the components added much to Republican vote totals in 
2004.  George W. Bush won the election due to a small increase in Republican 
partisanship rather than due to short-term forces moving Independents in his favor.  The 
components model for Independents thus tells a very different story about the 2004 
election than when the model is applied to the electorate as a whole. 
 Thus, the vote components model remains interesting in what it shows about 
elections, and it is even more interesting when the conventional analysis is augmented 
with summary statistics about the short-term forces and when the basic model is extended 
by focusing on the voting of Independents. 
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